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SAMENVATTING 
Sinds 2013 onderhandelt de Europese Unie (EU) vrijhandelsakkoorden met de Verenigde 
Staten (V.S.) (het ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ of TTIP) en Japan. Beide 
landen hebben sterke offensieve belangen in audiovisuele diensten, een traditioneel gevoelige 
sector in de EU. Het huidige Europese beleid ter zake is tweeledig. In het kader van de 
Algemene Overeenkomst betreffende handel in diensten (GATS) vallen audiovisuele diensten 
binnen het toepassingsgebied van het handelsakkoord maar beperkte de EU haar 
verplichtingen. Dat gebeurde aan de ene kant door middel van vrijstellingen voor de verplichting 
tot meestbegunstiging (MFN), en aan de andere kant door middel van beperkingen in de Lijst 
van specifieke verbintenissen (voor de verplichtingen tot markttoegang en nationale 
behandeling). In de bestaande Europese vrijhandelsakkoorden werd een andere strategie 
gehanteerd: audiovisuele diensten werden expliciet uitgesloten van het toepassingsgebied van 
de relevante bepalingen. In beide gevallen wordt gewag gemaakt van een ‘culturele exceptie’, 
die in de praktijk focust op audiovisuele diensten. 
In de context van de onderhandelingen met de V.S. en Japan rijst de vraag of de EU deze lijn 
zal aanhouden en, indien niet, hoe het toekomstig beleid er uit kan zien. In dit geval is het 
huidige beleid van de V.S. en Japan ten aanzien van andere handelspartners met defensieve 
belangen in audiovisuele diensten mogelijks indicatief. Een analyse van vier 
vrijhandelsakkoorden (tussen de V.S. en Canada, de V.S. en Korea, Japan en Zwitserland, en 
Japan en India) toont met name aan welke beperkingen op de liberalisering van audiovisuele 
diensten eerder aanvaard werden door de V.S. en Japan. 
In het eerste, tweede en derde deel van het rapport wordt ingegaan op de problematiek van de 
huidige culturele exceptie voor audiovisuele diensten. Het doel van deze exceptie is de 
bescherming van culturele diversiteit en pluralisme, een verplichting die rust op de EU zoals 
neergelegd in Artikel 3 §3 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie. De bijdrage van de 
huidige incarnatie van de culturele exceptie aan dit doel staat echter mogelijks onder druk. Ten 
eerste betreft de exceptie enkel audiovisuele diensten en niet andere diensten met relevantie 
voor cultureel pluralisme. Ten tweede geldt dit nog nadrukkelijker voor classificatieproblemen 
tussen audiovisuele diensten en naburige dienstensectoren. De cruciale vraag is bijgevolg of de 
culturele exceptie haar doel niet gedeeltelijk voorbijschiet. Bovendien is dergelijke uitsluiting van 
audiovisuele diensten mogelijks te restrictief om het doel van de culturele exceptie te bereiken. 
Eventuele offensieve Europese belangen en de voordelen van handelsliberalisering waarop het 
Europese handelsbeleid gebaseerd is, worden mogelijks beknot zonder dat dit bijdraagt aan het 
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beschermen van culturele pluraliteit en diversiteit. Technologische evoluties in de sector 
versterken beide problemen. De rechtsonzekerheid die hieruit volgt is groot. 
Het vierde en extensieve deel van het rapport omvat vier casestudies waarin de behandeling 
van audiovisuele diensten centraal staan. De eerste casestudy is de ‘North American Free 
Trade Agreement’ (NAFTA) voor wat betreft de V.S. en Canada. NAFTA, dat dateert van 1994, 
bevat een exceptie voor een gedefinieerde categorie van culturele industrieën. Deze sub-
sectoren zijn uitgesloten van het toepassingsgebied van de relevante bepalingen. Een 
dergelijke benadering heeft echter dezelfde problemen, zoals hierboven aangehaald, als de 
huidige Europese aanpak. De tweede casestudy is het vrijhandelsakkoord tussen de V.S. en 
Korea (KORUS) uit 2012. In dit akkoord worden audiovisuele diensten behandeld als eender 
welke dienstensector, met dien verstande dat Korea een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid beperkingen 
op de liberalisering in de sector onderhandelde. De meest relevante van deze beperkingen zijn 
verschillende types quota en lokale inhoudsvereisten, en de expliciete toelating om bepaalde 
specifieke activiteiten ex post te reguleren zonder daarbij gebonden te zijn door de relevante 
verplichtingen. Subsidies werden evenzeer uitgesloten van de verplichtingen betreffende handel 
in diensten en kunnen bijgevolg worden gebruikt als beleidsinstrument. 
De derde casestudy, het Japan-Zwitserland vrijhandelsakkoord uit 2009, biedt meer inzicht in 
relevant beperkingen op de liberalisering van audiovisuele diensten. Hoewel Zwitserland, net 
als de EU, geen verbintenissen opnam in het kader van GATS, werd de audiovisuele sector in 
dit vrijhandelsakkoord gedeeltelijk geliberaliseerd. Dit gebeurde echter met een nadruk op het 
behoud van culturele diversiteit en pluraliteit. De belangrijkste beperking stelt dat audiovisuele 
diensten die momenteel niet op de Zwitserse markt worden aangeboden uitgesloten worden 
van bepaalde verplichtingen. Een dergelijke vooruitziende beperking kan de rechtszekerheid 
sterk vergroten. Daarnaast zijn onder meer ook lokale (zowel Zwitserse als Europese) 
inhoudsvereisten opgenomen. De laatste casestudy behandelt het vrijhandelsakkoord tussen 
Japan en India uit 2011. Ook in dit akkoord zijn audiovisuele diensten onderworpen aan 
verplichtingen. India beperkte deze verplichtingen onder meer door te stellen dat toekomstige 
beleidsbepalingen omtrent buitenlandse directe investeringen de verbintenissen omtrent 
audiovisuele diensten kunnen beperken. De beperkingen zijn weliswaar minder toepasbaar voor 
de EU, en beperkter dan in het geval van Korea en Zwitserland. 
Tot slot stelt de paper dat de onderhandelingen omtrent audiovisuele diensten tussen de EU en 
de V.S., Japan en in het kader van de plurilaterale ‘Trade in Services Agreement’ (TiSA) vier 
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pistes kan volgen. Het uitgangspunt is steeds dat een culturele exceptie behouden blijft, al kan 
de vorm ervan wijzigen. De eerste mogelijkheid is eerder theoretisch en houdt in dat een 
uitzonderingsgrond (zoals in Artikel XIV GATS of Artikel XX GATT) zou worden toegevoegd 
voor de bescherming van culturele diversiteit. Deze oplossing is weinig aantrekkelijk gelet op de 
verscheidene voorwaarden die moeten vervuld worden om van een uitzonderingsgrond gebruik 
te maken. De rechtspraak omtrent de aangehaalde artikels illustreert dit. De tweede 
mogelijkheid is een status quo in vergelijking met de Europese praktijk in vrijhandelsakkoorden 
waarbij audiovisuele diensten worden uitgesloten van het toepassingsgebied van de relevante 
bepalingen. Dit is zeer onwaarschijnlijk in de TiSA onderhandelingen aangezien dit de andere 
partijen niet toelaat de sector onderling te liberaliseren. Een dergelijke aanpak werd ook 
geweigerd in de onderhandelingen voor GATS. De vraag rijst daarnaast of de V.S. en Japan 
akkoord zullen gaan met een totale uitsluiting. 
De derde mogelijkheid repliceert de situatie onder GATS: audiovisuele diensten vallen binnen 
het toepassingsgebied van het akkoord maar er worden geen verbintenissen aangenomen voor 
audiovisuele diensten en eventuele uitzonderingen op het meestbegunstigingsprincipe 
opgenomen. Een laatste mogelijkheid is gebaseerd op het Zwitsers en Koreaans model. Hierbij 
zijn audiovisuele diensten weliswaar onderworpen aan de verplichtingen in een akkoord maar 
wordt culturele diversiteit beschermd door middel van beperkingen. Dit kan de voornoemde 
problemen van de huidige culturele exceptie oplossen, maar vereist zeer zorgvuldig juridisch 
werk om geen ongewenste liberalisering te creëren. Deze strategie kan worden aangevuld met 
een uitsluiting van specifieke subsectoren binnen de audiovisuele sector.  
De Europese defensieve belangen en de offensieve belangen van zowel de EU als haar 
onderhandelingspartners nopen tot een grondig debat omtrent de best mogelijke bescherming  
van de culturele diversiteit en pluralisme aan de ene kant, en de voordelen van 
handelsliberalisering in een belangrijke economische sector aan de andere kant. 
 
 
 
Het onderzoek dat aan de basis ligt van dit rapport kadert in het programma ‘Steunpunten voor 
Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek’ dat gefinancierd wordt door de Vlaamse Overheid. Wij danken de 
Vlaamse Overheid voor de financiële steun en interesse in het onderzoek. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s (EU) decision to start negotiations with the United States (U.S.) for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and with Japan for the conclusion of a 
comprehensive, new generation regional trade agreement (RTA) incited inter alia a debate on 
the audio-visual services sector.1 As the U.S. and Japan have strong offensive interests in 
audio-visual services,2 the reticent position of the EU to liberalise this sector is likely to come 
under pressure in the negotiations. The EU’s has taken an adverse position which is fuelled by 
the so-called cultural exception, which aims to protect cultural diversity and plurality in the EU. 
Most popularly, the notion of the cultural exception is used in the context of European fears of 
being flooded by American culture. The aim of the cultural exception has ‘constitutional’ 
significance: the EU is required to respect the cultural and linguistic diversity and to safeguard 
and enhance its cultural heritage by virtue of Article 3 §3 of the Treaty on European Union. 
However, its specific application to audio-visual services, linked to common misperceptions and 
technological innovations may require the rethinking of this present conception of the cultural 
exception in  light of the current negotiations. 
Moreover, considering the likely pressure on the European position on trade in audio-visual 
services, the question arises how the U.S. and Japan have sought access to other markets in 
bilateral talks. Their respective RTAs also shed light on the concessions made by the respective 
                                               
1
 Although the official negotiating mandates are restricted, an overview is available from European 
Commission, ‘Member States Endorse EU-US Trade and Investment Negotiations’ (2013)  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=918> accessed 6 January 2014 and European 
Commission, ‘EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement: Commissioner De Gucht Welcomes Member States’ 
Green Light to Start Negotiations’ (2013)  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=847> 
accessed 6 January 2014. A leaked draft negotiating mandate for the TTIP is available at Public Content - 
World Trade Online, ‘Member States Seek More Specifics In U.S.-EU Mandate, Press Jurisdiction’ (Inside 
Washington Publishers, 2013)  <http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-
Trade-Online/member-states-seek-more-specifics-in-us-eu-mandate-press-jurisdiction/menu-id-896.html> 
accessed 7 January 2014. Additionally, it should be noted that little is known and little is asked 
concerning the mandate for the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement, although there are few reasons 
to expect a different EU approach there. See European Commission, Negotiations for a Plurilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Services (MEMO/13/107, 2013); European Parliament, Resolution of 4 July 2013 
on the Opening of Negotiations on a Plurilateral Agreement on Services (P7_TA-PROV(2013)0325, 2013) 
paras. 12 and 16; Pierre Sauvé, Dr. Jekyll or Mr. Hyde? Reflections on the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) (Study for the European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the European 
Union Workshop on the Plurlilateral Agreement on Services EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot 7/35, 2013) 
23. 
2
Jan Loisen, Actorposities inzake Cultuur en Handel in Internationale Fora (Rapport Steunpunt 
Buitenlands Beleid, Toerisme en Recreatie, 2010) 31. 
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counterparties in audio-visual services to the demands for liberalisation.3 Therefore, this report 
compares two American RTAs, i.e. with Canada and Korea, and two Japanese RTAs, i.e. with 
India and Switzerland. All four counterparties have strong defensive interests4 in audio-visual 
services and are comparable to the EU for our purposes. The outcome of this comparison is 
twofold. First, by relating commitments in the RTA to those in the multilateral General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the comparison will shed some light on what demands 
can be expected. Secondly, and more importantly, the comparison highlights which Canadian, 
Korean, Indian and Swiss defensive interests have been accommodated in the final 
agreements.  
This report continues as follows. Firstly, we will address the scope of the cultural exception. 
Secondly, we define the audio-visual services sector and how it relates to the cultural exception. 
Thirdly, we address some relevant issues in EU trade policy and how an RTA may restrict 
regulatory autonomy in the audio-visual services sector. Fourthly, we analyse the American and 
Japanese offensive successes and the counterparties’ defensive attainments in their respective 
RTAs with Canada and Korea, and Switzerland and India. Lastly, we present the main 
conclusions.  
 
1. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION 
To mitigate the risks of trade liberalisation vis-à-vis culture, notably the domination of American 
culture in a free market, some countries have sought to “safeguard Member States’ cultural 
prerogatives” and their “freedom to define and implement cultural policies”.5 The European 
Commission understands this ‘cultural exception’ as aiming at protecting cultural diversity,6 
through what are in practice trade-restrictive measures which protect domestic audio-visual 
                                               
3
 For a more general paper on audio-visual services in RTAs, see Martin Roy, ‘Beyond the Main Screen: 
Audiovisual Services in PTAs’ in Juan A Marchetti and Martin Roy (eds), Opening Markets for Trade in 
Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
4
 Defensive interests are interests for which (more) liberalization is not wanted, for example because the 
relevant domestic producers are likely to be less competitive than foreign producers. Offensive interests 
are interests for which there is an incentive to liberalise, for example because the domestic producers are 
likely to gain market share abroad. 
5
 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, ‘The External Dimension of EU Cultural Action and Free Trade: Exploring 
an Interface’ (2014) 41 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 65, 66. 
6
 European Commission, European Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Agreement: The Cultural Exception is Not Up for Negotiation! (MEMO/13/363, 2013). 
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services and their providers from foreign competition in a free market.7 In the context of the 
regulation of international trade, the cultural exception is the main instrument to achieve these 
goals.8 The strategies to do so include (i) an exclusion of culture from an agreement, (ii) the 
special treatment of culture within an agreement, or (iii) an exception clause for the protection of 
culture. We use the term ‘cultural exception’ regardless of the strategy used. 
The rationale behind a cultural exception relates foremost to the protection of national and 
cultural identity and heritage—a vital interest for a society,9 also in comparison to the classic 
exception grounds in trade law such as national security, public health, public morals or national 
treasures of artistic value—and the protection of international cultural diversity and pluralism.10 
The value of cultural diversity is not merely economic but culture also has an economic value. 
Based on this understanding, an additional economic rationale can be put forth: cultural goods 
and services are different from other goods and services, because they are not governed by 
traditional economic principles of comparative advantage. For example, (i) a monetary valuation 
does not take into account the intrinsic value; (ii) these goods and services are not substitutable 
nor interchangeable; (iii) a third country will not specialise in making another country’s cultural 
products or supplying its services.11 
Although the underlying issue is much older and can for example be traced back to the 1920s, 
the very early days of cinema,12 the origins of the cultural exception in international trade lie in 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations.13 The conclusion of these negotiations led to the 
                                               
7
 For an overview of different ‘formats’ in which such a goal can be reached, see Sandrine Cahn and 
Daniel Schimmel, ‘The Cultural Exception: Does it Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it 
Affect or is it Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS’ (1997) 15 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 
281, 293-297. 
8
 It should be noted that the General Agreement on Trade in Services does not contain a cultural 
exception, but rather no specific commitments (regarding market access and national treatment 
obligations) on audio-visual services were made by the EU. Moreover, the EU scheduled several 
exemptions to the Most-Favoured-Nation obligation for audio-visual services. Also see Emmanuel Cocq 
and Patrick A Messerlin, The French Audiovisual Policy: Impact and Compatibility with Trade Negotiations 
(Hamburg Institute of International Economics HWWA Report 233, 2003) 5-6. 
9
 Again, see Article 3 §3 of the Treaty on European Union. 
10
 Cahn and Schimmel 281 281-283; Joongi Kim, ‘The Viability of Screen Quotas in Korea: The Cultural 
Exception under the International Trade Regime’ (1998) 26 Korean Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 199, 225-226. 
11
 Kim 226. 
12
 See Victoria de Grazia, ‘Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European 
Cinemas, 1920-1960’ (1989) 61 The Journal of Modern History 53. 
13
 See Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen, ‘The WTO and the Audiovisual Sector: Economic Free Trade vs 
Cultural Horse Trading?’ (2003) 18 European Journal of Communication 291, 292-296; Frederick Scott 
Galt, ‘The Life, Death and Rebirth of the "Cultural Exception" in the Multilateral Trading System: An 
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establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Coincidently, GATS was 
adopted. Aside from Canada,14 especially France spoke out in favour of a cultural exception.15 
In today’s trade negotiations, upholding the cultural exception remains a strong defensive 
interest of the EU. 
 
2. THE AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES SECTOR AND THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION 
In trade parlance, the audio-visual services sector has “historically been plagued by problems of 
illdefinition, misperception, and intransigence.”16 This is partly due to the fact that the scope of 
the sector is often misunderstood. There are three components  which add to the complexity of 
defining the scope of the audio-visual services sector. 
First, when addressing services sectors in international trade law, one must properly (attempt 
to) classify the relevant services. The main instrument for the sectoral classification of services 
is the WTO’s Services Sectoral Classification List (SSCL), which in turn is based on the United 
Nations Central Product Classification (CPC 1.0). The SSCL is not obligatory, but in practice 
many WTO Members have followed its classification in their schedules of specific commitments. 
It should be noted that the SSCL categories are supposed to be mutually exclusive.17 According 
to the SSCL, the audio-visual services sector is a part of the broader category of 
‘communication services’. The audio-visual services sector contains five subcategories and a 
residual category. The subcategories are: (a) motion picture and video tape production and 
distribution services, (b) motion picture projection services, (c) radio and television services, (d) 
radio and television transmission services, and (e) sound recording. The residual category (f) is 
called ‘other’.18 Aside from audio-visual services, the list contains a category of ‘recreational, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural Protection and Intervention in the Face of American Pop Culture's 
Hegemony’ (2004) 3 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 909, 911-915; Martin Roy, 
‘Audiovisual Services in the Doha Round: "Dialogue de Sourds, the Sequel?"’ (2005) 6 The Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 923, 925-930; Jan Loisen, Overzicht van de Internationale Beleidscontext voor 
het Vlaamse Cultuur- en Mediabeleid (met Focus op Audiovisueel Beleid) (Rapport Steunpunt 
Buitenlands Beleid, Toerisme en Recreatie, 2009) 115-127. 
14
 Mary E Footer and Christoph Beat Graber, ‘Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy’ (2000) 3 journal of 
International Economic Law 115, 119-123. 
15
 Sophie Meunier, ‘The French Exception’ (2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 104, 106-107. 
16
 Galt 909 and the references at note 4 there. 
17
 United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
WT/DS285/AB/R, AB report adopted 20 April 2005 para. 180. 
18
 World Trade Organization, MTN.GNS/W/120, Services Sectoral Classification List (1991). See 
S/C/W/310, Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) 2, table 1. 
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cultural and sporting services’ (the heading explicitly states ‘other than audio-visual services’), 
which includes (a) entertainment services (including theatre, live bands and circus services), (b) 
news agency services, (c) libraries, archives, museums and other cultural services, (d) sporting 
and other recreational services, and (e) other services.19 The sector ‘other business services’ 
includes subsector (r) publishing and printing services. Thus, these subsectors are not part of the 
audio-visual services sector in the GATS context. Additionally, the distribution services sector is 
likely to be very relevant to audio-visual services,20 as may be the telecommunications services 
sector,21 the computer and related services sector,22 or the rental/leasing services without 
operators sector.23 Considering this amalgam of possibly relevant sectors, classification issues 
are likely to arise.24 These concerns are seriously increased by technical innovations,25 which 
seem unlikely to halt.  
As a result of the exclusive nature of classification, the audio-visual services sector does not cover 
these other cultural and supporting or adjoining services. Consequently, the term ‘cultural 
exception’ should be used carefully, as it indicates a broader coverage than just audio-visual 
services—a difference which is not always clear in media reports.26 The European Commission, 
                                               
19
 World Trade Organization SSCL. 
20
 Footer and Graber 137-138; S/C/W/310, Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 
January 2010) para. 7. With the exception of ‘Motion picture and video tape production and distribution 
services’, which are, as noted, part of the audio-visual services sector. 
21
 Cahn and Schimmel 303. Also see Americo Beviglia Zampetti, WTO Rules in the Audio-Visual Sector 
(Hamburg Institute of International Economics HWWA Report 229, 2003) 4; S/C/W/310, Audiovisual 
Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) paras. 9 and 84. At para. 9, the WTO 
Secretariat notes that 
“a specific commitment under GATS on telecommunication services (2.C.) would generally 
cover the transmission of signals, but would not entail a commitment on the supply of 
audiovisual content […].” 
22
 Pauwels and Loisen 306. 
23
 S/C/W/310, Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) para. 7. 
24
 See Rolf H Weber and Mira Burri-Nenova, Classification of Services in the Digital Economy (Springer 
2013). 
25
 Pauwels and Loisen 300. Also see Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, WTO, E-commerce, and Information 
Technologies: From the Uruguay Round through the Doha Development Agenda (Report for the UN ICT 
Task Force, 2005); Rolf H Weber, ‘International E-Trade’ (2007) 41 The International Lawyer 845; Rolf H 
Weber, ‘Digital Trade in WTO-Law - Taking Stock and Looking Ahead’ (2010) 5 Asian Journal of WTO & 
International Health Law and Policy 1. As concerns convergence between previously distinct subsectors 
and regulatory frameworks, see S/WPDR/W/48, Regulatory Issues in Sectors and Modes of Supply (Note 
by the Secretariat 13 June 2012) paras. 92 and 109-114. 
26
 See, e.g., Der Spiegel International, ‘Culture Wars: French 'Exception' Threatens Trade Deal’ (Der 
Spiegel, 2013)  <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/culture-wars-france-could-derail-trade-deal-
with-exceptions-a-905535.html> accessed 6 January 2014; James Kanter, ‘European Parliament Moves 
to Limit Scope of Eventual U.S. Trade Deal’ (The New York Times - The International Herald Tribune, 
2013)  <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/business/global/24iht-trade24.html?_r=0> accessed 6 
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does make a clear distinction and has highlighted that the audio-visual sector “has a clear place” 
among sensitive sectors covered by the cultural exception.27 Nonetheless, for ease of 
terminology—and considering that in the context of this debate ‘culture’ and ‘audio-visual’ have 
become largely synonymous—28 this report only addresses the cultural exception as it applies to 
the audio-visual sector. The term cultural exception is henceforth used in this narrow way. 
Second, and to add to the complexity of the debate, not all audio-visual services are necessarily 
covered by the cultural exception in the view of EU officials and negotiators. This was noted by 
President of the European Commission Barroso and Trade Commissioner De Gucht.29 As stated 
by the WTO Secretariat, the “importance of the [audio-visual services] sector stems from the 
fact that it has both economic components as well as social and cultural ones.”30 For supporters 
of a carve-out for audio-visual services from trade negotiations, such an approach opens up 
Pandora’s box. For the European Commission, it appears to be a matter of creating “new 
opportunities for Europe’s creative industries of the future”, in order to “secure a strong future in a 
high-tech sector that is developing at an extraordinary pace from social media to on-line 
distribution.”31 The European Commission did not explicitly identify any of these offensive 
interests nor did it address specifically how partial liberalisation will create such opportunities 
considering the existing commitments of the U.S. and Japan. Although general trade theory may 
presume such an effect, a detailed economic analysis in casu would be highly relevant.  
In any case, it is likely to be erroneous to see ‘the EU audio-visual services sector’ as a 
homogenous sector considering the multitude interests within each Member State, as 
                                                                                                                                                       
January 2014 and Martin Banks, ‘France on Collision Course with EU Commission over US Trade Deal’ 
(TheParliament.com, 2013)  <http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/france-on-
collision-course-with-eu-commission-over-us-trade-deal/#.UsrUKvRDvq8> accessed 6 January 2014. 
27
 European Commission, European Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Agreement: The Cultural Exception is Not Up for Negotiation!. Similarly, see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 23 May 2013 on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States 
of America (P7_TA-PROV(2013)0227, 2013) paras. 10-11. Also see European Parliament, Resolution of 
4 July 2013 on the Opening of Negotiations on a Plurilateral Agreement on Services paras. 12 and 16; 
European Parliament, Resolution of 12 March 2003 on the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) within the WTO, including Cultural Diversity (P5_TA(2003)0087, 2003) paras. 12-13. 
28
 Footer and Graber 119. 
29
 European Commission, Le Président Barroso Rassure les Cinéastes Européens sur la Protection de la 
Culture dans les Négociations avec les Etats-Unis (MEMO/13/537, 2013); European Commission, 
European Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Agreement: The Cultural Exception is Not Up for Negotiation!. 
30
 S/C/W/310, Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) para. 2. 
31
 European Commission, European Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Agreement: The Cultural Exception is Not Up for Negotiation!. 
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exemplified by publicly opposing statements by Member States’ representatives.32 Moreover, 
the music sector (which is already largely vertically integrated) and gaming sector (an inherently 
international sector) appear less outspoken about the exclusion of the sector. The main concern 
may thus lie with film services,33 and possibly the television sector. The film sector indicates that 
it has no offensive interests, as the American market is difficult to penetrate and the interest 
may be insufficient. Even if these offensive interests would prove insufficient compared to the 
defensive interests in the same subsectors, a conception of the cultural exception that is 
broader than necessary to protect cultural diversity and pluralism may have an unwarranted 
political cost in the negotiations. The protection of specific services sectors that do not 
contribute to the goal of the cultural exception has an opportunity cost in the form of negotiation 
capital, for which more suitable alternative uses are likely to arise in all aforementioned 
negotiations.  
Moreover, today’s audio-visual services sector is characterised by a few vertically integrated key 
players and an—at least economic—predominance of U.S. firms, resulting from inter alia 
advantages of scale, wealth and language.34 It has been noted that the ‘natural outcome’ for 
industries with these characteristics is not diversity but oligopolisation, unless policy 
interventions support smaller players in smaller minority-language markets with smaller 
budgets.35 It is perhaps an offensive interest of the EU to tackle this oligopolisation, as it forms 
an impediment to trade that may be much larger than many protectionist measures,36 and 
equally threatens diversity as it induces homogenisation.37 
                                               
32
 This is not a new situation, as the history of audio-visual talks in the Uruguay Round makes clear. See 
Loisen, Overzicht van de Internationale Beleidscontext voor het Vlaamse Cultuur- en Mediabeleid (met 
Focus op Audiovisueel Beleid) 113-127. Also see European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Country Guide’ 
(2014)  <http://www.obs.coe.int/country> accessed 19 March 2014 for some country-specific information.  
33
 Cine-Regio, Cine-Regio Common Declaration EU-US TTIP Mandate (ID 46323662272-17, 4 April 
2013, 2013); EPC EUROCINEMA, EBU, FERA, FIAD, UNIC and SAA,, Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Open Letter 10 April 2013, 2013). 
34
 Gillian Doyle, Audio-visual Services: International Trade and Cultural Policy (Asian Development Bank 
Institute Working Paper N° 355, 2012) 4 and 8-9. 
35
 Ibid 9. 
36
 Christoph Beat Graber, ‘WTO: A Threat to European Films?’ (V Congreso "Cultura Europea", 
Pamplona, 28-31 October 1998) 876-877; S/CSS/W/74, Communication from Switzerland: GATS 2000: 
Audio-visual Services (4 May 2001) para. 15; Doyle 17. On the regulation of competition in audio-visual 
services, also see S/WPDR/W/48, Regulatory Issues in Sectors and Modes of Supply (Note by the 
Secretariat 13 June 2012) paras. 115-118. 
37
 Christoph Beat Graber, ‘Audiovisual Media and the Law of the WTO’ in Christoph Beat Graber, Michael 
Girsberger and Mira Burri-Nenova (eds), Free Trade Versus Cultural Diversity (Schulthess 2004) 61-62. 
 15 
 
Third, the abovementioned remarks by top officials of the European Commission point at a crucial 
challenge for audio-visual services policy and the cultural exception: the technological evolutions 
in providing audio-visual services through the internet. As the WTO Secretariat notes: 
“The sector has undergone - and will continue to experience - significant change as a 
result of technological advances. Among other things, these make it easier, in terms 
of cost, quality and time, to transmit greater amount of content within and across 
borders; allow content to be distributed on a variety of platforms and devices by 
diverse operators; and give greater control to consumers over what they want to 
watch or listen, when, where, and how.”38 
Audio-visual services have become an important part of the digital economy, and are hoped to 
contribute substantially to economic revival and growth.39 The compromise between EU Member 
States, namely France, and the European Commission on the final TTIP negotiating mandate 
highlights this challenge. Audio-visual services are currently not part of the mandate but the 
European Commission may go back to the Council to request further negotiating directives,40 
which could include audio-visual services. Moreover, according to Trade Commissioner De Gucht, 
“what is really at stake in this sector is the digital revolution of the media environment. But there is 
currently no EU legislation on digital media.”  
It has been argued that the existing and conventional policy frameworks insufficiently address 
these changes (for example in supply and demand) brought by the digital revolution and lack the 
“potency to address appropriately the new digital conditions”.41 Take foreign content restrictions, 
which may no longer prove viable in a ‘pull’ model where consumers decide what they want to see 
and hear and when they do it.42 Similarly, it is unclear how these evolutions will reflect on existing 
obligations and commitments in GATS and RTAs, and more precisely whether the current 
                                               
38
 S/WPDR/W/48, Regulatory Issues in Sectors and Modes of Supply (Note by the Secretariat 13 June 
2012) para. 108. 
39
 Doyle 12. In 2008, the worldwide market for audio-visual services was projected at 516 billion U.S.$, 
over two and a half times that of for example newspaper publishing or internet access. S/C/W/310, 
Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) para. 17. 
40
 See European Commission, ‘Member States Endorse EU-US Trade and Investment Negotiations’. 
41
 Mira Burri-Nenova, ‘Trade Versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old Conflict in Need of a New 
Definition’ (2008) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 17, 40-45; Doyle 13. 
42
 S/C/W/310, Audiovisual Services (Background Note by the Secretariat 12 January 2010) paras. 80-83. 
The old model is a ‘push’ model, whereby media is pushed to all consumers through a limited number of, 
for example, television channels. Non-linear services, such as pay on demand, may prove especially 
difficult to regulate effectively through existing policy frameworks, as do new methods of media 
consumption. 
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approach to a cultural exception is still fitted for its purpose.43 It is unsurprising that the potential of 
such technological evolutions and their impact on trade obligations and commitments spur the 
interest of the EU’s counterparties with offensive interests in the sector, who are likely to focus 
their leverage on these issues rather than on existing trade-restrictive measures.44 
In conclusion, the above highlights three key issues. First, the cultural exception as applied to 
audio-visual services does not cover all cultural services relevant for cultural diversity and 
pluralism. In this sense, it may prove increasingly ill-fitting to achieve its goal. The legal 
uncertainty in this regard is substantial. This may equally be contrary to the approach of 
technological neutrality as applied in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.45 Second, the 
cultural exception as applied to audio-visual services may restrict an offensive potential of the EU 
audio-visual services sector. This could limit the potential of an increasingly important economic 
services sector. If not limiting the offensive potential, and as noted, an overly broad notion of 
cultural exception could have an opportunity cost in the form of lost negotiation capital if this cost 
is not necessary to protect cultural diversity and cultural pluralism. Third, technological evolutions 
in this rapidly changing sector have a crucial influence on both the first and second issue. 
Technological evolutions impact on the contribution of the cultural exception to its legitimate goal. 
On the other hand, such evolutions may mean that the cultural exception as applied to audio-
visual services is overly restrictive of trade. Of course, non-economic policy goals play an 
important role in the determination of the appropriate trade policy. Nevertheless, from the 
                                               
43
 See Mira Burri-Nenova, ‘Reconciling Trade and Culture: A Global Law Perspective’ (2011) 41 The 
Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society 1, where the author argues in favour of a trade and culture 
approach by successfully depolarising the debate, both on trade versus culture and on the technological 
changes in the media landscape. 
44
 Inside U.S. Trade, ‘Mandate Text Makes Future Negotiations On Audiovisual Services Unlikely’ (Inside 
Washington Publishers, 2013)  <http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-
Trade-Online/mandate-text-makes-future-negotiations-on-audiovisual-services-unlikely/menu-id-
896.html> accessed 9 January 2014, noting that: 
“In the U.S., industry sources have said they are most interested in ensuring that current EU 
policies aimed at protecting the audiovisual industry through subsidies and quotas in film 
screenings, television and radio programming is not extended to new technologies.” 
This is not a new insight, as it was already put forth over ten years ago: see Pauwels and Loisen 301, 
referring to a 2000 U.S. proposal to liberalise audio-visual services, where it is argued that the ‘new’ 
audio-visual services sector differ significantly from the ‘old’ one. 
45
 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
Coordination of Certain Provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member 
States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services. The Directive applies to moving images 
with or without sound, thus including silent films but not covering audio transmission or radio services 
(recital 23). It applies regardless of whether the content is linear or non-linear; broadcasted or as content 
provided through electronic communications networks. 
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perspective of the cultural exception, such an overly restrictive approach to trade may be 
debatable. Hence, the overlap between the scope of the cultural exception and the audio-visual 
services sector is, at both ends, existent but only partial. Additionally, even if the first or the 
second proposition were to fail further scrutiny, the prevalence of either proposition by itself is still 
suffice,t to warrant thorough scrutiny of the existing conception of the cultural exception. Hence, it 
is argued that it may be in the best interest of both the protection of cultural pluralism and 
diversity, and of services liberalisation to strike a deal that balances culture and economic 
interests in an encompassing and more legally certain way.46 This understanding can serve as a 
guide to the interpretation of the comparative analysis of RTAs that follows. 
 
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS RTAS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 
A. EU policy on audio-visual services in its existing RTAs 
EU policy on audio-visual services in existing RTAs is twofold. First, in a more general context, 
several existing EU RTAs include Protocols on Cultural Cooperation,47 although it is unclear 
whether the European Commission is looking to conclude similar agreements in the future. 
                                               
46
 See Tania Voon, Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press 
2007) 33-34, who summarises the framework for such a balancing exercise as follows: 
“Although the cultural industry is a business like any other, cultural products do have cultural, 
non-commercial features that distinguish them from other tradable goods and services. And 
sales of local cultural products in the marketplace may not adequately reflect the cultural 
value of those products to the wider community. This ‘market failure’ explains why some 
Members may wish to intervene in support of these products. Moreover, if Members see 
local cultural products as a means of communication among their people, or if they do not 
wish to stifle creativity, free speech, or the progressive development of culture, they may 
need to support local cultural products in a manner that discriminates expressly against 
foreign cultural products.” 
47
 L 289/I/3, 30 October 2008, Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States and 
the European Community; L 127/6, 14 May 2011, Free trade Agreement between the European Union 
and the Republic of Korea; L 346/3, 15 December 2012, Association Agreement between the European 
Union and Central America. Also see the standalone Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, which 
is similar to the Protocols. The aforementioned EU-Central America Protocol and the EU-Colombia and 
Peru Agreement have not yet entered into force. For an overview of their content, see Jan Loisen, 
Culturele Samenwerkingsprotocollen van de Europese Unie met Derde Landen: Stand van Zaken en 
Uitdagingen voor Vlaanderen (Rapport Steunpunt Buitenlands Beleid, Toerisme en Recreatie, 2010) and 
Psychogiopoulou 73-84. On the EU-Korea Protocol, also see Jan Loisen and Ferdi De Villé, ‘The EU-
Korea Protocol on Cultural Cooperation: Toward Cultural Diversity or Cultural Deficit?’ (2011) 5 
International Journal of Communication 254, who conclude that notwithstanding some strands of criticism 
on the Protocol are justified, the European Commission did not use the Protocol as a ‘back door’ way of 
putting audio-visual services on the trade negotiating table. 
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Additionally, the EU’s foreign cultural policy is not limited to RTAs: according to the European 
Commission, and this view was endorsed by the Council and the European Council,48 the EU 
should systematically integrate “the cultural dimension and different components of culture in all 
external and development policies, projects and programmes” and support specific cultural 
actions and events as “access to culture should be considered as a priority in development 
policies”.49 Second, as concerns legally binding provisions on trade in services, the EU has 
taken care to explicitly exclude audio-visual services from the scope of the relevant, binding 
sections regulating trade in services. Hence, in contrast to what is the case in GATS, audio-
visual services are by default not covered by these disciplines on services. 
 
B. A ‘multilateralising’ effect from existing Most-Favoured-Nation clauses? 
In the context of increased pressure on the EU to liberalise the audio-visual services sector, it 
may nonetheless be questioned whether potential commitments for audio-visual services have 
had a backlash. Do such commitments, accorded by the EU to a future RTA partner, need to be 
extended to existing RTA partners? This could theoretically be the result of a Most-Favoured-
Nation obligation (MFN)50 in an existing RTA, for example between the EU and Country A. The 
MFN obligation could oblige the EU to extend to Country A more preferential treatment given to 
subsequent RTA partner Country B. As an MFN provision can be, but is not necessarily 
formulated in such a ‘multilateralising’ way, an analysis of MFN obligations should be made on a 
case by case basis. Concerning the five most recent EU RTAs for which the final text is 
available,51 only the EU-CARIFORUM and EU-Korea RTAs contain MFN provisions for 
services.52 Both MFN provisions for services in the EU-CARIFORUM RTA are limited to those 
services within the scope of the relevant section. Audio-visual services have however explicitly 
been exempted from that scope. Moreover, the MFN provision includes a relevant exception for 
the protection for commitments related to audio-visual services in future RTAs: the MFN 
provision does not apply to treatment arising from future regional integration agreements if 
                                               
48
  Council of the European Union, Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European 
Agenda for Culture (OJ C 287, 29 November 2007, 1–4, 2007); European Council, Presidency 
Conclusions 16616/1/07 REV 1, 14 February 2008 (2008). 
49
 European Commission, COM(2007) 242 final, Communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a 
Globalizing World (2007) 10. For a recent overview of EU foreign cultural policy, see Psychogiopoulou. 
50
 In this context, the MFN obligation entails that a party to an RTA may not grant more favourable 
treatment to any third party than it does to like services or service suppliers from the other party to the 
RTA. 
51
 With the exception of the stabilisation agreements with Serbia, Albania and Montenegro. 
52
 This is not the case for the EU-Colombia and Peru, EU-Central America and EU-Iraq RTAs. 
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these create an internal market or require the parties thereto to significantly approximate their 
legislation with a view to removing non-discriminatory obstacles to commercial presence and to 
trade in services.53  
In the case of the EU-Korea RTA, both MFN provisions on services are equally limited to the 
scope of the section, of which audio-visual services are explicitly exempted. Additionally, an 
exception to the MFN provisions exists for treatment arising from future regional economic 
integration agreements granted if this treatment is granted under sectoral or horizontal 
commitments for which the other agreement stipulates a significantly higher level of obligations 
than those undertaken in the relevant section of the EU-Korea RTA.54 The evaluation of the 
level of the obligations shall be conducted on the basis of sectoral or horizontal commitments.55 
Considering that the EU did not undertake any commitments in the audio-visual services sectors 
in the EU-Korea RTA, it seems that any considerable commitments in a future agreement could 
satisfy the conditions for this exception to the MFN provision, if they encompass the right to 
establishment and the approximation of legislation.56 In conclusion, it seems that there are very 
few risks of ‘multilateralising’ future commitments in the audio-visual services sector on the 
basis of these existing MFN provisions in RTAs. 
 
C. Aspects of possible impact on regulatory autonomy of audio-visual services 
commitments in future EU RTAs 
Having established what the existing EU policy on audio-visual services is and that there is no 
risk of multilateralising future commitments vis-à-vis existing RTA partners, the question 
remains how EU policy in audio-visual services could be constrained by commitments. This 
question is impossible to answer in abstracto, but three further general issues deserve more 
attention. First are aspects of possible impact on regulatory autonomy which result from 
classification issues. Second are those aspects which result from the application of certain 
obligations to audio-visual services. Third are aspects related to the EU treaties. 
                                               
53
 EU-CARIFORUM EPA Articles 70 and 79. 
54
 EU-Korea RTA Articles 7.8 and 7.14. See Annex 7-B for more details on these thresholds, where it is 
noted that to be of a significantly higher level, obligations stipulated in a regional economic integration 
agreement shall either create an internal market on services and establishment or encompass both the 
right of establishment and the approximation of legislation. 
55
 Ibid Annex 7-B para. 1; Chien-Huei Wu, ‘Foreign Direct Investment as Common Commercial Policy: EU 
External Economic Competence After Lisbon’ in Paul James Cardwell (ed), EU External Relations Law 
and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Springer/TMC Asscher Press 2012) 397. 
56
 EU-Korea RTA Annex 7-B. 
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C.1 As a result of classification issues 
As noted in section 2, the classification of services is most likely to complicate the treatment of 
audio-visual services, especially considering technological innovations. In the context of audio-
visual services, a more fundamental distinction arises first. Are the relevant economic activities 
services, or are they goods? The analysis should be made in each specific factual matrix.57 In 
case it is decided that there is a supply of services, it is key to discern which services are (not) 
audio-visual services. The complexities of classifying new services using largely outdated 
classification tools and assessing possibilities of cross-sectoral classification for new methods of 
service distribution further complicate this analysis.  
The legal intricacies of these debates go beyond the scope of this report. A recommendation can 
nevertheless be made. Although it may be politically difficult, it would be wise to explicitly address 
these issues in future EU RTAs in order to considerably reduce the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the scope of commitments and obligations.58 It is clear from the scholarship that there are simply 
too many unknown variables in the existing classification system.59  Only after clarifying of what is 
covered under which sector an analysis of the contribution of the cultural exception to the 
protection of cultural diversity and pluralism can be executed.  
One example may be helpful. Specific commitments in sectors related to audio-visual services (as 
identified above) may constrain audio-visual policy if a lack of clarity obscures the delineation 
between the sectors. For example, streaming pay on demand services may on the one hand be 
considered to be classified as audio-visual services, more specifically as (c) radio and television 
services or (f) other, or on the other hand as computer and related services.60 The U.S., for 
example, have argued in favour of the latter classification for online games and may equally do so 
for video on demand. Thus, commitments in other sectors could constrain audio-visual policies in 
case the classification remains unsettled. The classification issue is complicated further because a 
method of supply, such as video on demand, can be based on different technologies, business 
models and proprietorship.61 A relatively clear-cut classification option is telecommunications, 
                                               
57
 See, for example, Tania Voon, ‘A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in the WTO: Rebalancing 
GATT and GATS’ (2007) 14 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 1, 6-10 and 17-18. 
58
 As for example Korea has done in the U.S.-Korea RTA, see infra. 
59
 See Roy, ‘Audiovisual Services in the Doha Round: "Dialogue de Sourds, the Sequel?"’ 947-949 for an 
overview and the recent book by Weber and Burri-Nenova, Classification of Services in the Digital 
Economy for an extensive discussion. 
60
 Weber and Burri-Nenova, Classification of Services in the Digital Economy 123, with references there 
to scholars who have argued in favour of this classification for video on demand services. 
61
 Ibid 121-122. 
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broadcasting and information supply services, which is a new category in the updated CPC 2.0.62 
(Although the link between the CPC 2.0 and the SSCL is unclear, this would not prevent parties 
from using it in their bilateral negotiations.) From a legal certainty perspective, the most suitable 
way to address these concerns is by introducing as much clarity as possible into the schedules, 
preferably with clear indications on how to classify technological evolutions in the sector.  
In any case, considering that this report focuses on audio-visual services, we address only those 
situations in which it is decided that the economic activity under scrutiny is a supply of a service, 
and the service can be classified as an audio-visual service. 
 
C.2 As a result of imposing obligations on audio-visual services policy 
The exceptional treatment of audio-visual services in RTAs may take three shapes (see section 
1). In the case of the EU, two models appear in practice. First, as is the case in EU RTAs, audio-
visual services may be explicitly and altogether excluded from the scope of the chapters on 
services.63 Second, as is the case in GATS, audio-visual services may not be excluded from the 
scope of the agreement, but the application of the relevant obligations is limited or excluded. This 
is the case for the MFN obligation which does not fully apply to the sector because of the MFN 
exemptions listed by the EU.64 Similarly, the national treatment and market access obligations do 
not apply to audio-visual services as the EU did not schedule any specific commitments in that 
respect.65 It should be recalled that in GATS and under the existing EU RTAs, the EU has made 
use of the so-called ‘positive listing’ approach.66 Positive listing entails that most notably the 
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 Ibid 124-125. 
63
 See, for example, EU-Korea RTA, Articles 7.4 (1) (a) and 7.10 (c). 
64
 See GATS/EL/31, European Communities and Their Member States: Final List of Article II (MFN) 
Exemptions (15 April 1994). 
65
 See GATS/SC/31, European Communities and their Member States: Schedule of Specific 
Commitments (15 April 1994).  
66
 See Juan A Marchetti and Martin Roy, The TISA Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues 
(World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-
11, 2013) footnote 6: 
“Generally speaking, in a positive-list approach to scheduling commitments, market access 
and national treatment are granted only in the sectors expressly listed by each party in its 
schedule; for each sub-sector, the parties then indicate the level of commitment granted for 
each mode of supply. In contrast, in a negative list approach, market access and national 
treatment apply fully to all covered service sectors, except to the extent that non-conforming 
measures (commonly referred to as “reservations”) providing otherwise have been listed in 
annexes. In other words, under this approach, everything is in principle liberalized unless 
specified otherwise in the annexes. In a positive-list approach, nothing is liberalized, unless 
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market access and national treatment obligations only apply to those sectors specifically listed. Of 
course, any scheduled limitations limit such applicability. As will be noted in the case studies, the 
U.S. makes use of the negative listing approach. A negative list means that all sectors which are 
not explicitly scheduled, and thereby excluded, are considered to be covered by the relevant 
obligations. Such an approach would appear to have a lock-in effect and requires very careful 
scheduling.67 Japan has used both approaches. Current EU practice may nonetheless change 
soon. In the context of the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), a hybrid scheduling 
approach in which national treatment obligations and limitation would be scheduled according to 
a negative list and market access through a positive list was agreed.68 Moreover, although 
officially unconfirmed, many sources claim that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA) already includes a negative list.69 It thus 
seems very likely that the EU will agree on a negative list in the context of TTIP, and possibly 
also vis-à-vis Japan. 
If audio-visual services were to become subject to obligations and commitments in RTAs, the 
regulatory autonomy for policies in audio-visual services may be limited. These obligations and 
commitments could preclude the effective use of relevant policy instruments. In the audio-visual 
services sector, often used policy instruments include content quotas (such as television and 
cinema screen quotas), import quotas (for example limiting the number of foreign films to be 
shown in cinemas), foreign equity ceilings, competition rules protecting free access to 
information and pluralism of media (for example restrictions on cross-ownership or must-carry 
rules vis-à-vis the domestic audio-visual industry), subsidies (such as national subsidy 
                                                                                                                                                       
expressly specified otherwise. Negative-list agreements also typically include a 'ratchet' 
mechanism, which automatically binds future liberalization for remaining existing non-
conforming measures.” 
In case of such ratcheting, a renegotiation of unwanted specific commitments may be possible. 
67
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programmes, the Council of Europe’s Eurimages or the EU’s MEDIA programme), licensing 
requirements (for example based on reciprocal market access), fiscal measures (such as taxes 
on cinema tickets to support the domestic film industry or the Belgian tax shelter), or measures 
related to intellectual property rights (for example, copyright-based cultural funds which may 
withhold a certain percentage of copyright revenue to support domestic productions).70 Thus, 
several disciplines—for example, relating to market access, competition, subsidies, domestic 
regulation, non-discrimination and intellectual property rights—may constrain policymakers in 
their audio-visual services policy options.  
Take, for example, the Belgian tax shelter in favour of audio-visual productions. The regime is a 
fiscal incentive for Belgian commercial establishments investing in Belgian commercial 
establishments whose main activity is producing audio-visual works, for the production of a film 
or television series. Under certain conditions, investments related to the production and 
exploitation costs of the audio-visual work are 150% tax deductible if these costs are made in 
Belgium. Under GATS law, such an incentive would be qualified as a measure affecting trade in 
services and is not subject to an exception to the scope of GATS. If the EU were to undertake 
specific commitments in audio-visual services, the tax shelter would need to be scheduled as a 
limitation to the national treatment obligation as it awards more favourable treatment to 
domestic service suppliers than it does to foreign suppliers. Alternatively, the tax shelter could 
be exempted from the scope of the obligation by scheduling a horizontal limitation for 
subsidies.71  
Of course, it would upset the balance between the aim of the cultural exception and the 
offensive interest in audio-visual services to completely open up the sector to the free market. It 
would hence be up to policymakers to identify those instruments which are best suited to protect 
cultural diversity and pluralism in the EU audio-visual services sector without unnecessarily 
restricting trade. In that perspective, it has been noted that subsidies are the preferred policy 
tool because they seem effective, are economically preferable and are less trade distorting than 
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other instruments.72 Considering the foregoing, it was possibly a defensible decision by the 
European Commission to not exclude audio-visual services indefinitely from its negotiating 
mandate: it may prove more fruitful to first assess through which effective policies the digital 
environment needs to be addressed in order to actually protect cultural diversity without limiting 
the offensive interests of the EU audio-visual sector. 
 
C.3 As a result of the EU treaties and the Lisbon reforms 
The political viability of a compromise along the lines of what was suggested, i.e. explicitly 
protecting cultural diversity and pluralism but not excluding the entire audio-visual services 
sector (supra), may be substantially weakened by claims subjecting and equating the audio-
visual sector to the cultural exception. It should also be recalled that the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements on trade in audio-visual services are subject to specific voting 
requirements in the Council. Article 207(4)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) states that the Council, in which a representative of each EU Member State has a 
vote, shall act unanimously in the field of trade in cultural and audio-visual services, where 
these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity. This requirement 
equally applies in case of a wider agreement that contains only some provisions related to trade 
in cultural and audio-visual services.73 Hence, EU Member States retain a veto right in the 
decisions to authorise the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the 
signing of agreements and conclude them.74 French politicians have made reference to the use 
of their veto if audio-visual services are covered by TTIP.75 
An unsolved question that may have an impact on reaching a compromise within the EU lies in 
the Lisbon Treaty reform, which granted explicit exclusive competence to the EU in matters of 
trade in services.76 This raises questions as to the negotiation of differentiated specific 
commitments in RTAs by Member States. Considering an intra-EU split on trade in audio-visual 
services, this question may be especially poignant. However, the Lisbon reforms theoretically 
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leave room for differentiated commitments for Member States, although this would need to be 
balanced with the principle of equality and the uniform application of the Common Commercial 
Policy.77 
 
4. THE U.S. AND JAPAN, A SELECTION OF THEIR RTAS AND AUDIO-VISUAL 
SERVICES 
In this section, we conduct a comparative analysis of four RTAs as concerns their application to 
and treatment of audio-visual services. Considering the EU’s negotiations for an RTA with the 
U.S. and Japan, we assess respectively two U.S. and two Japanese RTAs as concerns 
obligations and commitments from the counterparties in the audio-visual services sector in the 
following sections. 
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. is the largest exporter of audio-visual services and, in 2007, 60% of its 
exports went to the EU.78 Moreover, the U.S. is the main proposer for increased liberalisation in 
audio-visual services and has been successful in pursuing this strategy in bilateral talks.79 In a 
2013 overview of foreign trade barriers relevant to its interests, the U.S. makes extensive 
reference to barriers in audio-visual services sectors,80 which indicates further interest in 
opening up markets to American audio-visual services. Moreover, the top ten largest motion 
pictures firms by market share and box office revenue consists of eight U.S. firms (two of which 
are co-owned by respectively Australian and French firms), and two Japanese firms.81 On the 
other side of the Pacific, Japan has sided with the U.S. in several aspects of the audio-visual 
services debate,82 which for example shows in its specific commitments in GATS.83 An 
illustration of Japan’s status as an important player in audio-visual services is that, considering 
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its relatively small population of about 125 million, it is noteworthy that the number of Japanese 
movies produced in 2008 is the third highest in the world. This resulted in a share of domestic 
films in cinemas of about 60%—putting Japan in the global top five in this regard.84  
We start each subsection by briefly addressing each counterparty’s interests in audio-visual 
services. Then, we address whether, how and to what extent the RTA applies to audio-visual 
services. Lastly, we analyse this application from the perspective of the protection of cultural 
pluralism. 
 
A. The U.S. and Canada in NAFTA 
Canada has a tradition of balancing its cultural sensitivities and economic interests with the U.S. 
and is in favour of wide regulatory autonomy to protect its cultural objectives.85 Its audio-visual 
services policies, through an array of protectionist and promotional measures, have aimed at 
creating a Canadian market separate from the American and French markets.86 Canada has 
done so through several policy instruments. For example, twenty years after the 1994 North-
American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA)87 came into force, the Canadian content 
requirements in programming expenditure and amount of programming in broadcasting are 
considered a serious barrier to trade in audio-visual services by the U.S.88 Similarly, there is a 
quota for Canadian popular music selections in broadcast.89 Canada equally played a leading 
role in the promotion of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions.90 
As mentioned, the Canadian delegation sought to exclude audio-visual services from GATS 
negotiations in 1988.91 Hence, unsurprisingly, Canada did not undertake specific commitments 
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in its GATS schedule of specific commitments and listed several MFN exemptions.92 Translating 
this to international trade means that, even today, for Canada, “audio-visual services remain no-
go zones in services trade.”93 In NAFTA, Canada was able to negotiate a quite encompassing 
cultural industries exception. Although the position of Canada remains very relevant for the EU, 
considering they are undoubtedly allies in this debate, it should be stressed at the outset that 
NAFTA (and GATS) were negotiated in times very different from present day. 
 
A.1 The cultural industries exception 
NAFTA contains a general exception on cultural industries. Article 2107 NAFTA defines those 
as inter alia (i) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of films and audio recordings, and 
(ii) all radio, television and cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and 
broadcast network services.94 Hence, this definition of cultural industries aims to include mostly 
“such cultural industries that, because of their public appeal, may affect the cultural identity of 
Canada.”95 Article 2106 juncto Annex 2106 NAFTA holds that any measure adopted or 
maintained with respect to cultural industries shall be governed by the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA).96 Article 2012 CUSFTA contains an identical definition of cultural 
industries to the one found in NAFTA, and Article 2005 (1) CUSFTA holds that cultural 
industries are exempt from the provisions of the agreement—with three limited exceptions.97 
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More importantly, the exemption is limited by Article 2005 (2) CUSFTA, which holds that actions 
by a party which would violate CUSFTA (or NAFTA) were it not for the exemption, could be 
countered by the other party through a measure of equivalent commercial effect. This "tit-for-tat" 
type retaliation mechanism appears to remain more of a diplomatic leverage mechanism than a 
source of formal retaliation.98 The provision may nonetheless have a chilling effect, i.e. 
discouraging taking certain measures under the threat of retaliation, although it should be 
stressed that it only applies in case the measure regarding the cultural industries violates 
Canadian obligations under NAFTA. Moreover, its scope is subject to debate.99 Hence, the 
cultural exception clause should perhaps be seen more as an exception, as its place in NAFTA 
Chapter 20 indicates, than an exemption.100 If Canadian policymakers deem a measure is 
warranted even though it violates Canadian NAFTA obligations, the least favourable outcome is 
equivalent retaliation—and not a dispute which may lead to the requirement of bringing 
Canadian law in accordance with its obligations or potentially higher than equivalent 
compensation.101 
If one compares the scope of NAFTA’s cultural industries exception insofar it covers audio-
visual services to the EU’s practice of excluding the audio-visual services sector, it should be 
noted that the NAFTA exception is more detailed but both largely coincide. It is however unclear 
how and whether new technologies may fit in the cultural exception in NAFTA.102 Hence, there 
may be some room to argue that NAFTA could cover certain audio-visual services, especially 
considering that NAFTA obligations on services apply to all services,103 except those listed in 
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Canada’s schedule in Annexes I, II or V, which contain no reference to audio-visual services. 
Hence, the schedule follows the negative listing approach. Consequently, measures relating to 
such services would need to comply with NAFTA’s cross-border trade in services obligations on 
national treatment, MFN treatment and non-discriminatory measures such as but not limited to 
quantitative restrictions, licensing requirements and performance requirements. Notably, 
subsidies or grants provided by a party or a state enterprise, including government-supported 
loans, guarantees and insurance are not covered by the provisions on cross-border trade in 
services and investment.104 Similarly, measures relating to such audio-visual services not 
covered by the cultural industries exception would need to be in accordance with the obligations 
protecting investment on national treatment, MFN treatment, minimum standard of treatment, 
performance requirements, nationality requirements for senior management and boards, 
transfers relating to an investment or investor, and expropriation. As concerns investment, the 
exception for subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a state enterprise, including government 
supported loans, guarantees and insurance is limited to the national treatment, MFN treatment 
and nationality requirements for senior management and boards.105 The agreement also 
contains some limited provisions on competition policy related to trade in services and 
investment, including designated monopolies and state enterprises.106  
If a measure were the fall outside the cultural industries exception and consecutively violate an 
obligation contained in NAFTA, it could still be justified on the basis of its legitimate policy goal. 
The general exceptions clause for measures affecting trade in cross-border services and 
telecommunications, which predates Article XIV GATS, only contains exceptions for measures 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to health and safety and consumer 
protection insofar they do not violate the chapeau of the exceptions clause.107 
 
A.2 Appraisal 
Canada managed to integrate exceptional treatment for its cultural industries into NAFTA. The 
pragmatic definition of cultural industries in the agreement does not cover all audio-visual 
services. Moreover, considering its twenty year anniversary, it is unsurprising that the definition 
                                               
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid Chapter 11. 
106
 Ibid Chapter 15. 
107
 Ibid Article 2102(2). 
 30 
 
of cultural industries does not solve the classification issued addressed above. An inflexible 
listing of exempted services may be unfitted with the tempo of technological advances. A 
forward looking definition would be required to do so. Furthermore, although there is some 
discussion on the scope of retaliatory measures which the U.S. may take if Canada makes use 
of the cultural industries exception, it seems that the ‘equivalent commercial effect’ provision is 
used sparingly. However, the retaliatory provision appears flawed to distinguish measures that 
do contribute to these goals from others. Moreover, the cultural industries exception and the 
retaliatory provision may be perceived as a symbolic adoption of culture as a commodity. In that 
regard, reforming it to be more like a cultural exception in the sense of Article XIV GATS or XX 
GATT could be a better option although care should be taken to determine the modalities of the 
exception.108 
On the one hand, the cultural industries exception is the most far-reaching protection of the 
audio-visual services sector in the four case studies under scrutiny. On the other hand, the 
exception is not necessarily solely focused on the goal of promoting diversity and pluralism but 
is sweeping. In that sense, it favours industries with defensive interests that would not be 
covered by a true cultural exception. Considering the approach taken by the European 
Commission in the TTIP mandate and the U.S.’ strong offensive interests, it may not be very 
likely that such a sweeping exception would be part of TTIP.  
 
B. KORUS 
Since the 1990s, the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) has a strong domestic audio-visual 
industry, ranking eighth worldwide in terms of the number of films produced in 2008, which 
resulted in a share of domestic films of 32% of all released films in 2010.109 Moreover, the 
market share of Korean films was 46% in 2010, whilst other non-Hollywood movies only 
accounted for about 5%.110 The Korean broadcasting industry, which includes radio and 
television stations, cable TV, satellite TV, digital multimedia broadcasting, internet protocol TV 
and “program providers that create content or have acquired the right to broadcast taped 
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television and radio programs”, has embraced technological innovations.111 The Korean GATS 
schedule of specific commitments includes full commitments for Modes 1, 2 and 3 for 
subsectors (a) motion picture and video tape production and distribution services and (e) record 
production and distribution services (sound recording).112 Korea did not list any MFN 
exemptions related to audio-visual services.113 This indicates that Korea has a quite open policy 
as concerns audio-visual services. However, the country is also one of few making use of 
screen and broadcasting quotas, which were a thorn in the flesh of those in favour of 
liberalisation in the audio-visual services sector.114 However, Korea has undertaken 
commitments on audio-visual services in the 2012 U.S.-Korea RTA (KORUS)115 which go far 
beyond its WTO commitments—for example by halving cinema screen quotas.116 Nonetheless, 
although its GATS commitments are quite extensive for film and sound recording services, 
Korea appears to be the U.S.’ RTA partner that maintained most reservations on television and 
radio services.117 
 
B.1 KORUS obligations apply to audio-visual services 
KORUS does not contain a cultural exception or an exception for audio-visual services. Its 
Chapter 12 covers measures affecting trade in cross-border services, with the exception of 
subsidies or grants provided by Korea or the U.S., including government-supported loans, 
guarantees, and insurance.118 Consequently, trade in audio-visual services is largely subject to 
the disciplines of this chapter. The measures must conform to obligations on national treatment, 
MFN treatment, market access and local presence requirements.119 Consequently, as concerns 
for example the screen and broadcast quotas, the U.S. considers that “KORUS protects against 
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increases in the amount of domestic content required and ensures that new platforms, such as 
online video, are not subject to these legacy restrictions.”120 Whether the Korean quotas apply to 
new platforms is dependent on the exact way in which they are formulated. Annex I specifies 
those measures exempted from one or more of the four aforementioned obligations. This 
signals the use of a negative list approach. For the sectors and activities listed in Annex II, 
Korea may maintain existing, or adopt new or more restrictive, measures that do not conform 
with these obligations. 
Regarding investment, Chapter 11 of KORUS contains obligations on national treatment, MFN 
treatment, minimum standards of treatment, expropriation and compensation, transfers, 
performance requirements, and nationality requirements for senior management and board of 
directors.121 Annex I again specifies existing measures that may be inconsistent with the 
obligations on national treatment, MFN treatment, performance requirements and nationality 
requirements for senior management and board of directors. Similarly, Annex II contains sectors 
and activities for which measures that do not conform with these obligations may be maintained 
or new or more restrictive ones may be adopted. With the exception of the provision on 
performance requirements, the last mentioned obligations do not apply to subsidies or grants 
provided by a party, including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance.122 
In addition to the obligations on investment and cross-border trade in services, KORUS contains 
relevant obligations for telecommunications services,123 electronic commerce, which is explicitly 
subject to the chapters on investment and trade in services,124 and competition.125 Notably, the 
annexes do not exempt measures from these obligations. 
Measures which violate the obligations of KORUS may still be justified by the exceptions 
contained in the agreement. Most importantly, the general exception clause of Article XIV GATS 
is incorporated mutatis mutandis in KORUS as concerns the chapters on cross-border trade in 
services and electronic commerce.126 There is however no such general exceptions provision 
for the provisions on investment. 
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B.2 Exemptions for audio-visual services in the Annexes 
As noted, Annex I contains exemptions from two sets of obligations for existing measures. First, 
as concerns cross-border trade in services, measures listed in the annex are exempted from 
national treatment, MFN treatment, market access and local presence requirements obligations. 
Second, regarding investment, the same goes for the obligations on national treatment, MFN 
treatment, performance requirements and nationality requirements for senior management and 
board of directors. The exemptions only apply to the obligations listed in their entry. In the case 
of audio-visual services, the following exemptions are relevant. 
Foreign news agency services may only supply news communications under a contract with a 
news agency organised under Korean law which has a radio station license. Moreover, foreign 
governments, foreign persons, Korean companies without a Korean CEO or president, who also 
needs to be domiciled in Korea, or with a foreign person holding 25% or more of the shares may 
not supply news agency services. Foreign nationals, companies or governments may not obtain 
a radio station license.127 
The CEO or president of a foreign company, even if she is a Korean national, may not serve as 
CEO, president or chief programmer of several types of broadcasting companies.128 Moreover, 
licenses for terrestrial broadcasters, cable system operators, satellite broadcasting operators, 
signal transmission networks, business operators or program providers may only be granted to 
or held by a Korean government or a Korean juridical person. Foreign persons and government 
may not hold more than 49% of stocks or equity interests in broadcasters, operators and 
program providers.129 
Broadcasting quotas exist, both covering overall Korean content and genre-specific Korean 
content, for terrestrial broadcasters, program providers, cable system operators, satellite 
broadcasting operators and satellite digital multimedia broadcasting operators. Certain separate 
content quota requirements apply to a terrestrial digital multimedia broadcasting operator. 
Nonetheless, Korea is obliged to permit that no less than 80% of a terrestrial broadcaster’s, 
cable system operator’s, satellite broadcasting operator’s or program provider’s quarterly 
programming hours of foreign content per genre are foreign content of a single country. Screen 
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quotas oblige cinema operators to project Korean motion pictures for at least 73 days per year 
at each screen in Korea.130 
Annex II lists measures that do not conform with these obligations but may nonetheless be 
maintained. New or more restrictive measures may equally be adopted if covered by these 
limitations. The Korean schedule includes a blanket provision that limits the market access 
obligation for cross-border trade in services to the scope of Korea’s schedule for Article XVI 
GATS.131 The Annex also includes a general exemption from MFN treatment for the application 
of reciprocity measures or international agreements involving sharing of the radio spectrum, 
guaranteeing market access or national treatment with respect to the one way satellite 
transmission of direct-to-home and direct broadcasting satellite television services and digital 
audio services.132 
Korea equally reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure that (i) limits cross-
ownership among media sectors; (ii) as concerns program providers engaged in multi-genre 
programming, news reporting or home-shopping, sets the minimum percentage of issued stocks 
or equity interest that serves as a threshold to determine whether a juridical person is foreign or 
Korean; (iii) requires the members of the board of directors of the supplier of broadcasting 
services to be Korean nationals or residents; (iv) requires a platform operator to retransmit a 
terrestrial broadcasting channel or to transmit a public interest channel; (v) with respect to a 
terrestrial broadcaster or a program provider that primarily provides animation programming or 
is engaged in multi-genre programming, requires a certain percentage of annual programming 
hours to be newly produced Korean animation; (vi) imposes an outsourced production content 
quota, expenditure requirement for Korean production, or prime time quota; (vii) requires a 
supplier of broadcasting services that provides video on demand services to store a certain 
percentage of Korean content, provided that such a requirement does not result in the storage 
of videos for which there is negligible consumer demand; or (viii) as concerns suppliers not 
approved at the signing of KORUS, restricts or prohibits foreign retransmitted broadcasting 
services (including foreign cable channels) in a specific category.133 
Furthermore, Korea reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect to a 
supplier of subscription based video services, as part of future regulatory reforms in the 
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broadcasting and telecommunications sectors that may violate, as concerns investment, 
performance requirements, national treatment and senior management and boards of directors 
obligations, and as concerns cross-border trade in services, national treatment, market access 
and local presence obligations.134 
The Korean schedule exempts preferential co-production arrangements for film or television 
productions from both MFN treatment obligations and the performance requirements 
obligation.135  
Lastly, as concerns both national treatment obligations and the performance requirements 
obligation, Korea also reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure setting criteria for 
determining whether broadcasting or audio-visual programs are Korean.136 Regarding digital 
audio or video services,137 measures ensuring that access to Korean digital audio or video 
content or genres thereof is not unreasonably denied to Koreans, and as concerns such 
services targeted at Korean consumers, measures promoting the availability of such content.138 
 
B.3 Appraisal 
The Korean commitments and exemptions paint a complex picture that is hard to analyse 
without in-depth knowledge of domestic Korean audio-visual policies. The negative listing 
approach contributes to relatively extensive commitments as all unscheduled measures are 
considered covered by the obligations. The approach may also have a lock-in effect where new 
services are submitted to the obligations of the agreement. 
However, Korea has also negotiated extensive limitations. Notably, the exclusion of subsidies 
from the scope of the obligations may be very important from a policymaking perspective. (This 
equally holds true for many other areas of services policies.) The licensing system, combined 
with foreign equity caps, limits to cross-ownership and nationality requirements for top-level 
personnel indicate Korea’s commitment to having Korean companies in control. This approach 
puts some of the responsibility in the hands of the private sector, as individual entrepreneurs 
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may nonetheless decide to not focus on cultural pluralism. This is not the case for screen 
quotas, which are an enforceable and, on report, watertight way of securing such pluralism. The 
outsourced production content quota and expenditure requirements for Korean productions play 
similar roles. The question is however how they function vis-à-vis technological advances. 
Notably, the Korean schedule imposes content quota for video on demand with the qualification 
that this doesn’t lead to the storage of videos which are not in demand by consumers. It thus 
remains to be seen how effective such quotas will be when facing competition from foreign 
content. A clever limitation is that for future regulatory reforms of subscription based video 
services. This type of functionally limited and forward looking limitations may prove key in 
addressing the classification issues and providing legal certainty. 
 
C. The Japan-Switzerland RTA 
Considering its three official languages and position at the heart of Europe, Switzerland has 
extensive experience with cultural pluralism. Its audio-visual culture is very comparable to that 
of several EU Member States. The example of Switzerland is also notable considering a Swiss 
2001 Communication in the context of the Doha Round of negotiations.139 The Communication, 
circulated in the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services, contained a proposal on trade in audio-
visual services that attempted to reconcile commercial interests in the audio-visual sector and 
the cultural sensitivities related to it. The proposal appeared aimed at bridging the gap between 
the EU and U.S. positions—India seemed to underwrite a similar stance as well.140 It noted that 
the ideological differences on audio-visual policymaking could be overcome by addressing the 
individual concerns of Members in the form of limitations on market access and national 
treatment obligations.141 Notably, the Communication also points at the relevance of competition 
policy to further both economic and cultural interests.142 Perhaps surprisingly, considering the 
Communication, the Swiss GATS schedule of specific commitments contains no commitments 
on audio-visual services.143 The Swiss list of MFN exemptions comprises three entries related to 
audio-visual services, which aim at the promotion of cultural objectives and at regulating access 
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to the small Swiss market in order to preserve diversity of supply. The relevant measures relate 
to access to funding and distribution, granting the benefits of support programmes and the 
allocation of screen time, and the granting of concessions.144 
 
C.1 RTA obligations apply to audio-visual services 
The 2009 agreement between Switzerland and Japan (Japan-Switzerland RTA)145 does not 
explicitly address audio-visual services. It neither contains a cultural exception of sorts. Chapter 
6, regulating trade in services, covers audio-visual services. Obligations to accord MFN and 
national treatment apply, as does a market access obligation.146 All three obligations apply to all 
sectors but are limited by the reservations listed in Annex III, signalling the use of a negative list 
approach.147 The Japan-Switzerland RTA also contains a binding provision on domestic 
regulation, but it is limited to the sectors for which GATS commitments have been scheduled 
(although not subject to the limitations therein. This approach is alike GATS’ conditional general 
obligations).148 As noted, this is not the case for Switzerland with regards to audio-visual 
services. Interestingly, the chapter of the agreement on services does not exclude subsidies 
from its scope. Hence, subsidies should be treated as all other services, as is the case under 
the GATS regime.149 Scheduled limitations may nonetheless exempt subsidies from the scope 
of the MFN, market access and national treatment obligations. 
Chapter 6 contains a general exceptions clause modelled after Article XIV GATS, with both a 
closed list of legitimate objectives and a chapeau to avoid abuse.150 The exception for measures 
securing the compliance with domestic laws explicitly refers to such laws which aim at 
protecting the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal 
data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.151 
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In addition to the provisions on trade in services, the Japan-Switzerland RTA includes a chapter 
on measures affecting electronic commerce for both goods and services.152 The principle of 
technological neutrality, i.e. that the supply of services transmitted electronically is not 
discriminated against vis-à-vis other methods of service supply, is explicitly affirmed.153 The 
reservations of Annex III apply mutatis mutandis to the non-discrimination and market access 
provisions of this chapter,154 as does the general exceptions clause of Chapter 6.155  
Furthermore, the agreement includes provisions on the protection of investment.156 The 
obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security to investments 
of investors of the other party and regarding expropriation are not limited by reservations.157 
This is, on the other hand, the case for the MFN and national treatment obligations.158 The 
applicable list of reservations is not Annex III but Annex IX. As concerns Switzerland, this annex 
mostly refers back to Annex III.159 Thus, in practice, there is only one relevant Annex, which 
contains limitations that apply to both Chapters 6 and 9. Finally, Chapter 10 of the Japan-
Switzerland RTA contains some disciplines on competition. 
If a measure were to violate any of the obligations contained in the agreement, it may still be 
justified on the basis of, in the case of audio-visual services, the general exceptions clauses. In 
the case of Chapter 6 and as concerns electronic commerce,160 this is Article 55. The chapeau 
of the provision and the list of legitimate policy goals are substantially identical to that of Article 
XIV GATS. Concerning investment, Article 95 explicitly incorporates, mutatis mutandis, Article 
XIV GATS into the RTA. 161 
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C.2 Exemptions for audio-visual services in Annex III 
As noted in the previous section, the most important obligations in the Japan-Switzerland RTA 
are (mostly) limited by one list of exceptions in Annex III for both trade in services and 
investment.162 Several limitations are relevant for or apply specifically to audio-visual services. 
Foremost, as concerns national treatment, Switzerland reserved the right to adopt and maintain 
subsidies, tax incentives and tax credits not inconsistent with their GATS obligations. 
Considering that Switzerland made no specific commitments on audio-visual services in GATS, 
it may adopt measures granting these types of more favourable treatment to its own service 
suppliers.  
The Swiss schedule refers to specific domestic legal provisions which differentiate between 
broadcasting services and telecommunications services. Based on these distinctions, the 
schedule contains a blanket limitation for non-conforming measures affecting programme 
transmission services, radio and television cable services and radio and television services.163 
As a protection mechanism for ‘new’ or residual services, the schedule contains an explicit 
provision for specific services. If specific services are not mentioned in the CPC classification 
but are considered to fall within one of its residual categories, possible measures affecting such 
services are not necessarily listed.164 A related but more specific provision addresses new 
audio-visual services in several subsectors. They are: programme transmission services; radio 
and television cable services; motion picture and video production and distribution services; 
motion picture projection services; radio and television services; other entertainment services; 
other recreational services and internet-based services. It is stated that for new services—i.e. 
services that are not currently delivered on the Swiss market in these subsectors—Switzerland 
reserves the right to adopt any measures. As concerns establishment, such measures shall 
grant national treatment, but this does not apply to cross-border trade in services.165 
Switzerland reserves the right to maintain, modify or adopt any measures restricting market 
access or national treatment for video tape and motion picture related services on the grounds 
of public morals or protection of individuals. This applies in particular, but appears not limited to, 
to sexual, obscene, or violent contents.166 With regard to internet services, similar measures 
may be taken for the protection of youth or for the prevention of addiction or compulsive 
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behaviour and other mental health hazards.167 Similarly, Switzerland explicitly reserved the right 
to ban the advertisement of tobacco products and medicinal products only available on 
prescription and restrict the advertisement of alcoholic beverages in radio, television and other 
programme transmission services.168  
The Swiss motion picture industry is safeguarded by a reservation for motion picture or video 
tape production services, motion picture or video tape distribution services, and motion picture 
projection services. The reservation contains the right to treat audio-visual works covered by co-
production agreements more favourably. Measures granting benefits under support 
programmes, such as MEDIA and EURIMAGES, are equally exempted from the MFN and 
national treatment obligations. This also applies to measures relating to the allocation of screen 
time which implement arrangements such as the Council of Europe Convention on trans-frontier 
television. Lastly, Switzerland reserved the right to confer more favourable treatment to audio-
visual works and suppliers of audio-visual services meeting specific European origin criteria.169 
As concerns licensing for programme transmission services, radio and television cable services 
and radio and television services, licences may not be granted to a juridical person under 
foreign control, to a Swiss juridical person with foreign capital participation or to a natural person 
who does not have Swiss nationality if reciprocity is not granted. Furthermore, there is a 
maximum number of licences per broadcasting company (independent of the company’s 
origin).170 
In the television broadcast transmission services, television cable services, television 
programming services and combined television programme making and broadcasting services 
subsectors, television broadcasters with a national or regional language programme service are 
obliged to reserve at least 50% of their broadcasting time for Swiss or European productions 
and are obliged to reserve at least 10% of their broadcasting time or of their production costs for 
works from independent Swiss or European producers. Moreover, such television broadcasters 
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which broadcast films must spend at least 4% of their gross revenue on purchase, production or 
co-production of Swiss films or must pay a corresponding support fee of up to 4%.171 
The Swiss schedule contains a reservation for motion picture or video tape distribution services 
which, in order to guarantee linguistic diversity, requires that a same film may only be distributed 
by a film distribution enterprise once the company possesses the rights for all language versions 
of the film for the entire territory of Switzerland.172 
On similar grounds of insufficient diversity as well as quality of cinematic offerings, incentive 
fees may be levied to promote such diversity. Additionally, only natural persons domiciled in 
Switzerland or juridical persons established in Switzerland, if all board members are domiciled 
in the country, may show or distribute films intended for public projection. These persons must 
also be registered in a public register.173 These measures are linked to the Federal Constitution 
of Switzerland, which reads in relevant part: 
“1 The Confederation may encourage Swiss film production and film culture. 
2 It may issue regulations to promote the diversity and the quality of the 
cinematographic works that are offered.”174 
Lastly, the exhibition or projection of films in cafés, restaurants, discotheques, nightclubs and 
similar premises may be prohibited or subject to authorisation which may violate market access 
or national treatment obligations.175 
 
C.3 Appraisal 
Considering that Switzerland did not make commitments in audio-visual services in GATS, it is 
notable that it did undertake commitments in this RTA. From the point of view of the EU, this is 
useful as it highlights how to partially liberalise the sector whilst protecting defensive interests. 
Some of the techniques used in Switzerland’s schedule merit analysis. 
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The limitation that allows Switzerland to grant discriminatory subsidies permits the use of a 
powerful and economically preferable policy instrument. The blanket limitation for programme 
transmission services, radio and television cable services and radio and television services has 
the effect of excluding specific sub-sectors from the scope of the market access and national 
treatment obligations. 
An important limitation is the forward-looking CPC code reservation. However, it may be 
insufficiently detailed to address all of the classification issues as noted above as it does not 
cover new services which may be classified under existing CPC codes. Therefore, the additional 
but sub-sector specific limitation for services that are not currently delivered on the Swiss 
market in these subsectors is an interesting instrument. It is forward looking but does require 
Swiss regulators to know in sufficient detail which services are currently being delivered on the 
Swiss market. Nonetheless, it allows ex post regulation that does not comply with the 
obligations in the Japan-Switzerland RTA for any new service. The weak spot of the provision 
may be the definition of ‘new service’. For example, as noted above some services use various 
technical means to supply a similar service. Does this create a new service? It would be useful 
to add some guidance as to how ‘new’ service should be interpreted. 
The license cap per company is a safeguard against horizontal integration and monopolisation 
of the market. The limitations related to co-production and European works are clear indications 
of a Swiss policy that aims at protecting domestic and European film industries. This equally 
applies to foreign ownership and control limitations, and to screen quotas and local content 
requirements for European and Swiss works. The incentives for diversity as well as quality of 
cinematic offerings have similar aims. The anchoring of these objectives in the case of film in 
the Swiss constitution is notable. Moreover, all of these limitations are clearly focused on 
cultural pluralism. They award policymakers with a relatively clear set of policy instruments that 
may be used to promote specific audio-visual services sectors. An analysis of their 
effectiveness in practice could be very valuable for the EU’s negotiation leeway on audio-visual 
services. 
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D. The Japan-India RTA 
The large Indian economy is home to over 1,2 billion potential consumers.176 Its audio-visual 
sector is successful, fast-growing and thus has large offensive interests,177 inter alia in exporting 
to Indians abroad. However, India has also expressed its wish to maintain its ‘cultural 
identity’.178 Although for now, Indians seem to prefer Indian audio-visual content, this natural 
protectionist sentiment is eroding and imported audio-visual content is gaining popularity. The 
relative openness of the market, which lacks for example subsidies, would seem to play an 
important role in both these aspects of the Indian audio-visual services sector, as it may on the 
one hand speed up Americanisation as well as on the other hand help solidify India as a major 
global player.179 
The Indian GATS schedule of specific commitments only contains relevant commitments for 
motion picture or video tape distribution services as concerns Mode 3. The market access 
commitments are limited as the number of import titles is restricted to 100 per year and the 
services can only be supplied through representative offices. The national treatment 
commitments are equally subjected to limitations. In order to be granted national treatment, the 
motion picture must have either won an award or participated in an international film festival 
notified by the Indian government, or received good reviews in prestigious film journals notified 
by the Indian government.180 The apparent purpose of such limitations is to both restrict the 
import of foreign films as ensure the cinematographic quality of imports. India equally scheduled 
an MFN exemption for audio-visual services which is aimed at the promotion of cultural 
exchange. According to the exemption, the MFN obligation does not apply to measures which 
define norms for co-production of motion pictures and television programmes with foreign 
countries insofar they grant national treatment to motion pictures and television programmes co-
produced with foreign countries which maintain a co-production agreement with India. The 
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exemption applies to all relevant audio-visual services and can be applied to any beneficiary 
third country.181 This limitation is similar to that of Switzerland discussed above. 
 
D.1 RTA obligations apply to audio-visual services 
The scope of India’s 2011 agreement with Japan (Japan-India RTA)182 does not exclude audio-
visual services. For the purpose of audio-visual services, Chapter 6 of the agreement has the 
same scope as GATS: it applies to all measures affecting trade in services—i.e. the supply of a 
service through one of four modes of supply.183 The market access and national treatment 
commitments in the agreement are, unlike KORUS and the Japan-Switzerland RTA, based on a 
positive list approach.184 The commitments, and limitations thereto, are scheduled in Annex 6. 
The chapter also contains a non-binding MFN provision. The domestic regulation provision 
mirrors Article VI GATS and contains, aside from a negotiating mandate, only a standstill 
provision. As concerns subsidies, an obligation to consult applies. Notably, the dispute 
settlement procedures do not apply to the provision. Consequently, it seems that subsidies 
which violate the obligations under the agreement cannot be adjudicated upon. 
Chapter 8 applies to measures relating to investors of a party and to their investments. The 
national treatment, MFN and prohibition of performance requirement obligations apply to all 
investments covered by the chapter, except to non-conforming measures listed in Annex 8 and 
to sectors listed in Annex 9. Additionally, a general fair and equitable treatment applies 
unconditionally. 
For the purposes of Chapters 6 and 8, Article XIV GATS is incorporated into the agreement and 
applies mutatis mutandis.185 
Competition policy is the subject of Chapter 11, which obliges the parties to take measures 
which it considers appropriate against anticompetitive activities, in order to facilitate trade and 
investment flows. Therefore, each Party must apply its competition laws and regulations in a 
manner which does not discriminate between persons in like circumstances on the basis of their 
nationality. Again, the dispute settlement procedures do not apply to the provision. 
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D.2 Exemptions for audio-visual services in Annexes 6, 8 and 9 
Annex 6 contains the commitments and limitations thereon for Chapter 6 of the Japan-India 
RTA. A horizontal market access limitation for Mode 3 states that in certain sectors, the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Board needs to approve the investment. This is not the case for any 
audio-visual services.186 For national treatment in Mode 3, a horizontal limitation is scheduled 
for subsidies, which shall be available only to domestic service suppliers.  
For both market access and national treatment in Mode 3, limitations listed in the Indian 
Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2 of 2010, and any updates thereof, shall be applicable.187 The 
Circular contains several relevant limitations. There is a 20% FDI cap for terrestrial broadcasting 
(FM radio) services. These services are also “subject to such terms and conditions as specified 
from time to time” by the Indian government for the permission for setting up of FM radio 
stations.188 A 49% FDI cap applies for cable networks services and direct-to-home services, 
which are also “subject to conditions as specified from time to time by the Indian 
government”.189 The FDI limit in headend-in-the-sky broadcasting services is 74%, and these 
services are again “subject to guidelines, terms and conditions as specified from time to time by 
the Indian government”.190 The setting up of hardware facilities services such as up-linking 
HUB/Teleports, up-linking non-news & current affairs TV channels, and up-linking news & 
current affairs TV channels is also subject to various FDI limits. FDI for up-linking TV channels 
will be subject to compliance with the Up-linking Policy of the Indian government. The 
companies permitted to uplink the channel shall certify the continued compliance of this 
requirement at the end of each financial year.191 
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Annex 6 further contains identical commitments and limitations for concerns audio-visual 
services to those scheduled under GATS: there are no commitments except for motion picture 
or video distribution services and the limitations discussed supra apply.192 
Annex 8 contains reservations for measures related to investment that do not comply with the 
national treatment and MFN obligations or that do impose performance requirements of Chapter 
8 of the RTA. Measures contained in present and future FDI Circulars are listed as a horizontal 
reservation for MFN and national treatment.193 A horizontal reservation for services functions as 
a standstill obligation: India reserves the right to maintain any measure relating to investments 
in services sectors subject to the condition that they do not violate the obligations under Chapter 
6.194 This is an affirmation of Article 90.1 (a) Japan-India RTA. Similarly, and an affirmation of 
Article 90.1 (b) of the agreement, any existing measures framed by the state governments, 
union territories and local governments are not subject to either national treatment, MFN or the 
prohibition of performance requirements obligations derived from Chapter 8.195 
Annex 9 contains sectors and activities to which the national treatment, MFN and the prohibition 
of performance requirements obligation do not apply. A horizontal services limitation stresses 
that India reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to investments in 
services sectors subject to the condition that they do not violate the obligations under Chapter 
6.196 India equally reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to investments 
as per the laws and regulations framed by the state governments, union territories or local 
governments.197 
 
D.3 Appraisal 
The horizontal limitation on national treatment for subsidies in Mode 3 is a recurring limitation to 
exempt this policy tool from the national treatment obligation. Although no subsidies appear to 
be in place for the audio-visual services sector, the Indian government preserved its policy 
space to do so at a later stage. 
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The broad terminology “subject to guidelines, terms and conditions as specified from time to 
time by the Indian government” which may lead to limitations on both market access and 
national treatment in Mode 3 allows ample room for manoeuvring for domestic policymakers. 
The FDI caps again relate to keeping control of specific service suppliers in Indian hands. The 
‘terms and conditions’ may include further specifications in this regard, as for example in the 
case of Korean nationality requirements for CEOs. The reiteration of GATS commitments and 
limitations is again directed at ensuring market share for domestic films and ensuring the 
cinematographic quality of imports. 
All other limitations are more broadly applicable than to audio-visual services. The treatment of 
these services as such is limited. However, the horizontal and general limitations contained in 
the various annexes could cover many measures that address audio-visual services. In the 
context of the EU, more commitments have already been made and therefore such general 
limitations are unlikely to be used extensively in addition to the existing ones in current EU 
scheduling practice. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report  began with a contextualisation of the cultural exception in a complex field of the 
European services sector. The current embodiment of the cultural exception focuses on audio-
visual services, a sector that does not comprise all relevant activities related to the goal of the 
exception, i.e. the protection of cultural pluralism and diversity. Increasing classification issues 
also reduce legal certainty on its scope. Moreover, the comprehensive exclusion of audio-visual 
services may be overly restrictive in order to reach the aforementioned goal, thereby limiting 
both potential EU offensive interests and the benefits from trade liberalisation in general. The 
crucial question is whether this form of the cultural exception is sufficiently effective on the one 
hand and, moreover, not overly restrictive on the other hand.  
The four case studies subsequently highlight other possibilities of addressing audio-visual 
services. The analysis foremost highlights that the U.S. and Japan are willing to leave room for 
the sensitivities of the audio-visual services sector. RTAs are, in the end, the result of 
negotiations, and the case studies represent countries with sufficient defensive interests in this 
sector. In the case of the EU, this would be even more so: any EU commitment on audio-visual 
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services would be a first in an RTA. Hence, the EU could take advantage of this situation to 
devise a negotiating strategy that ends up in a balanced situation that adequately and effectively 
protects cultural diversity and pluralism, and any EU offensive interests in the audio-visual 
sector. If these offensive interests are deemed insufficient, the increased legal certainty should 
be welcomed by the audio-visual services sector. As a consequence of scheduling limitations 
for relevant policy instruments, the possibility of efficient use of these instruments should at the 
least remain status quo. The gained political capital may subsequently be used in other parts of 
the negotiations. 
The key findings of the comparative analysis are the following. Subsidies have usually been 
excluded from the scope of the relevant services provisions (or as was the case in the Japan-
Switzerland RTA listed as a limitation). This key policy instrument is thereby safeguarded from 
applicable trade law obligations. This is notable considering that subsidies are in principle 
subject to GATS obligations (insofar no MFN exemptions have been scheduled, and as 
concerns market access and national treatment limited by the Schedule of specific 
commitments).  
Furthermore, the U.S. makes use of the negative listing approach. The EU apparently agreed to 
such an approach in both TiSA and CETA negotiations, at least for national treatment. 
Switching from positive to negative listing requires comprehensive knowledge of the relevant 
measures that need to be exempted. In the case of 28 EU Member States, this may not be an 
easy process. However, as CETA talks draw to a close, there must be some experience in the 
European Commission of doing so. In any case, if there are to be commitments for audio-visual 
services, they are likely to be partially made though negative listing. 
This change of listing approach is not necessarily problematic for cultural diversity and 
pluralism. The 2001 Swiss proposal to liberalise audio-visual services whilst protecting cultural 
pluralism through market access and national treatment obligations may not have satisfied 
those critical of audio-visual services liberalisation. However, the Japan-Switzerland RTA and, 
to a lesser extent KORUS, puts this take in practice in a negative listing scenario. The Swiss 
and Korean limitations show that there can be room for the protection of pluralism. Reservations 
should nonetheless be phrased very carefully to avoid unwanted liberalisation in the future. 
Additionally, the focus on measures protecting diversity and pluralism rather than on specific 
measures leaves room for future policymaking. The recurring Indian limitation on future 
regulations comes to mind. 
 49 
 
Bearing this in mind, there are four ways in which the negotiations can go forward whilst 
including a cultural exception. First, a rather far-fetched possibility is adding an explicit 
justification ground to the general exceptions clause for the protection of cultural pluralism. The 
conditions which would then need to be satisfied are substantial. Even if the policy ground were 
to be constructed as an easier to satisfy—but unused in GATS—‘relating to’ (e.g. Article XX (g) 
GATT: relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources) instead of the more 
stringent ‘necessary’ (e.g. Article XIV (a) GATS: necessary to protect public morals), the 
requirements of the chapeau remain difficult to meet. Such an approach would equally be less 
easy to predict and thus less legally certain. 
The second option is a status quo in which audio-visual services are excluded explicitly from the 
scope of the agreement. Existing RTAs in which this approach was followed, have been 
concluded with much smaller economies. These trading partners have much less leverage and 
interests to persuade the EU into making commitments on audio-visual services. In this context, 
a more likely reference point may be GATS. In the negotiations leading up to the 1995 GATS 
(and contrary to the Canadian cultural industries exception in the 1994 NAFTA), the EU (and 
Canada) was unable to exclude audio-visual services from the scope of GATS. In the TTIP and 
EU-Japan RTA negotiations, a similar situation may occur. While the economic importance of 
the European market gives the EU strong leverage, it may be questioned whether the U.S. and 
Japan are likely to accept total exclusion. In the context of TiSA, an exclusion seems even less 
likely, as this would have implications for the comprehensive nature of the final agreement for all 
parties.  
Third, audio-visual services treatment could copy the GATS approach: they come within the 
scope but are subject to MFN exemptions and no commitments as concerns market access and 
national treatment are made. From a defensive point of view, this approach would have the 
same result as altogether excluding audio-visual services. From an offensive point of view, this 
could lock-in existing policies from the counterparties. In TiSA, this approach definitely seems 
most probable. 
Under the last option, following the Swiss and Korean approach, carefully drafted limitations 
which are forward looking could be a strategy to advance European offensive interests whilst 
maintaining defensive interests and providing legal certainty. This strategy could be 
complemented by excluding more specific subsectors from the scope of the audio-visual 
services sector. An example of such practice is the EU GATS schedule on education services, 
 50 
 
which excludes publicly funded education from the schedule. In such a case, care should be 
taken to schedule precisely and comprehensively, especially considering the likelihood of a 
negative list approach, at least for national treatment. 
The case studies show that the U.S. and Japan partners do not necessarily oppose reservations 
aimed at protecting cultural diversity and pluralism. As was noted in sections 1-3 of this report, 
exclusion (i.e. options 3 and 4 above) is not necessarily the best option considering that the 
efficiency of the cultural exception, as applied to audio visual services, vis-à-vis the goal of 
cultural pluralism may need reconsidering. On the one hand, the EU’s size will give European 
negotiators more leverage than the Canadian, Korean, Swiss and Indian negotiators had. The 
reservations in the case studies could be considered a baseline standard in that regard. As no 
European audio-visual commitments have been made to date and given that the sector is  
known to be a sensitive one, the EU may be able to sell a limited set of commitments for a 
comparably large prize. On the other hand, the American and Japanese interests in gaining 
access to the EU market are much larger than in the four cases and more political capital may 
be invested than before.  
In any case, specific European measures and services will be targeted by American and 
Japanese negotiators. With a very clear rationale for excluding certain services and policy 
instruments, the EU may find a mutually acceptable compromise more easily achieved. 
Protecting European cultural identity and pluralism is not only a treaty obligation for the EU but 
also a crucial defensive interest. Therefore, the strategy to do so should attempt to fulfil this 
obligation in the most effective way. The current approach is not the most legally certain and 
raises questions as to its effectiveness. Moreover, it may not cater for all relevant policy 
concerns. The current negotiations provide a window for readdressing this issue in order to 
better protect cultural diversity and pluralism whilst capitalising maximally on potential first 
commitments in the audio-visual services sector. 
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ANNEX 1: OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE: 2013 
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 
As referred to in footnote 77 of this report, pages 149 and 150 of the U.S. Trade 
Representative’s Report read as follows: 
“Television Broadcasting and Audiovisual Services 
The 2007 EU Directive on Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) amended and extended the 
scope of the Television without Frontiers Directive (which already covered traditional 
broadcasting, whether delivered by terrestrial, cable, or satellite means) to also cover 
audiovisual media services provided on-demand, including via the Internet. EU Member State 
content quotas for broadcasting remain in place. On-demand services are subject to somewhat 
less restrictive provisions than traditional broadcasting under the AVMS Directive, which does 
not set any strict content quota, but still requires Member States to ensure that on-demand 
services encourage production of, and access to, EU works. This could be interpreted to refer to 
the financial contribution made by such services to the production and rights acquisition of EU 
works or to the prominence of EU works in the catalogues of video on-demand services. EU 
Member States had to implement the AVMS Directive into their national law by December 19, 
2009. In its first report on the application of the Directive from May 2012, the Commission 
announced that 25 Member States have notified complete implementation into their national 
legislation. Poland and Belgium, however, still need to adapt their legislation, and the former is 
currently subject to an infringement procedure for failing to fully implement the Directive. 
Member State Measures: 
Several EU Member States maintain measures that hinder the free flow of some programming 
or film exhibitions. A summary of some of the more significant restrictive national practices 
follows. 
France: France continues to apply the EU Broadcast Directive in a restrictive manner. France’s 
implementing legislation, which was approved by the European Commission in 1992, requires 
that 60 percent of programming be EU and 40 percent French language. These requirements 
exceed those of the Broadcast Directive. Moreover, these quotas apply to both the regular and 
prime time programming slots, and the definition of prime time differs from network to network. 
The prime time restrictions pose a significant barrier to U.S. programs in the French market. 
Internet, cable, and satellite networks are permitted to broadcast as little as 50 percent EU 
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content (the AVMS Directive minimum) and 30 percent to 35 percent French-language product, 
but, in exchange, channels and services are required to increase their investment in the 
production of French-language product. In addition, radio broadcast quotas that have been in 
effect since 1996 specify that 40 percent of songs on almost all French private and public radio 
stations must be in French. 
Beyond broadcasting quotas, cinemas must reserve five weeks per quarter for the exhibition of 
French feature films. This requirement is reduced to four weeks per quarter for theaters that 
include a French short subject film during six weeks of the preceding quarter. Operators of 
multiplexes may not screen any one film with more than two prints, or through staggered and 
interlocking projection techniques, in such a way as to account for more than 30 percent of the 
multiplex’s weekly shows. Theatrically released feature films are not allowed to be advertised on 
television. 
Italy: Broadcasting Law DL 44, which implements EU regulations, reserves 50 percent of the 
programming time (excluding sports, news, game shows, and advertisements) for EU works. 
Ten percent of transmissions (and 20 percent for state broadcaster RAI) must be reserved for 
EU works produced during the preceding five years. Within this quota, an undefined percentage 
of time must be reserved for Italian movies. 
Poland: Broadcasters in Poland must devote at least 33 percent of their broadcasting time each 
quarter to programming that was originally produced in the Polish language. 
Spain: For every three days that a film from a non-EU country is screened, in its original 
language or dubbed into one of Spain’s languages, one EU film must be shown. This ratio is 
reduced to four to one if the cinema screens a film in an official language of Spain and keeps 
showing the film in that language throughout the day. In addition, broadcasters and providers of 
other audiovisual media services must annually invest 5 percent of their revenues in the 
production of EU and Spanish films and audiovisual programs. In 2010, the government revised 
the audiovisual law and imposed restrictions on non-EU ownership (limited to no more than 25 
percent share) and leasing of AV licenses, which have negatively impacted U.S. investors.”   
 58 
 
PARTNERS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEDERLANDS 
Het Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
(www.globalgovernancestudies.eu) coördineert de derde generatie van het 
Steunpunt “Buitenlands beleid, internationaal ondernemen en 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking” voor de Vlaamse Regering. Een Steunpunt heeft als 
doel de wetenschappelijke ondersteuning van Vlaams beleid. 
Het project brengt 17 promotoren en 10 junior onderzoekers (waarvan acht 
doctoraatsstudenten) samen. Het Steunpunt doet aan (a) dataverzameling en -
analyse, (b) korte termijn beleidsondersteunend wetenschappelijk onderzoek, (c) 
fundamenteel wetenschappelijk onderzoek en (d) wetenschappelijke dienstverlening. 
We werken samen met een aantal partners: het Antwerp Centre for Institutions and 
Multilevel Politics, de Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School en H.U.Brussel. 
Binnen de KU Leuven maken ook collega’s verbonden aan de Faculteit Economie, 
het Instituut voor Internationaal en Europees Beleid, de Onderzoekseenheid 
Internationaal en Buitenlands Recht, het Instituut voor Internationaal Recht, het 
Instituut voor Europees Recht en HIVA - Onderzoeksinstituut voor Arbeid en 
Samenleving deel uit van het project. 
Het onderzoek is verdeeld over vier thematische pijlers: (i) Internationaal en 
Europees Recht; (ii) Internationaal en Europees Beleid; (iii) Internationaal 
ENGLISH 
The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies coordinates a Policy Research 
Centre on "Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development 
Cooperation" for the Flemish Government. A Policy Support Centre aims to 
scientifically support Flemish regional policies. The project brings together 17 senior 
and 10 junior researchers (including eight PhD students). 
The Centre conducts (a) data collection and analysis, and provides (b) short-term 
policy supporting research, (c) fundamental scientific research and (d) scientific 
services. 
The Policy Research Centre is based on an inter-university consortium led by the 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (www.globalgovernancestudies.eu) in 
cooperation with the Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics,  the 
Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School and the H.U.Brussel. Within the KU 
Leuven, colleagues from the Faculty of Business and Economics, the HIVA - 
Research Institute for Work and Society, the Institute for International and European 
Policy, the Research Unit International and Foreign Law, the Institute for International 
Law, and the Institute for European Law are also involved in the project. 
Research is structured in four thematic pillars: (i) International and European Law; (ii) 
International and European Policy; (iii) International Entrepreneurship; and (iv) 
Development Cooperation. 
For more information, see our website: www.steunpuntiv.eu  
